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DISPERSANTS: THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS OR A
CURE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE?
Catherine Kilduff and Jaclyn Lopez*

I. INTRODUCTION
The April 20, 2010, BP oil spill is widely regarded as the nation’s
worst environmental disaster. The explosion of the Deepwater Horizon
oil rig resulted in the death of eleven crewmen, and thousands of fish, sea
turtles, birds, and marine mammals.1 The federal government estimates
that 4.9 million barrels (or 205.8 million gallons) of oil spilled into the
Gulf of Mexico from the rogue well.2 In addition to the direct effect on
wildlife from the spilled oil, which includes reduced ability to regulate
temperature, forage, and nest, the unprecedented application of
dispersants also likely impacted wildlife. During the oil spill, BP released
roughly 1.84 million gallons of dispersants into the Gulf, 1.07 million
gallons to the surface and 771,000 subsea.3 The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) approved these measures despite its admission
that no one fully knew the environmental effects of the dispersants,

* Catherine Kilduff and Jaclyn Lopez are staff attorneys at the Center for Biological
Diversity and contributed equally to this article.
1. See generally Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Deepwater Horizon
Response Consolidated Fish and Wildlife Collection Report, NOAA DEEPWATER
HORIZON ARCHIVE, http://www.noaa.gov/deepwaterhorizon/wildlife/index.html (last
visited Mar. 4, 2011) (providing cumulative data on wildlife affected by the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill from May 2010 to November 2010).
2. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, U.S. Scientific Teams Refine Estimates of Oil
Flow from BP’s Well Prior to Capping (Aug. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/US-Scientific-Teams-Refine-Estimates-of-OilFlow-from-BP-Well-Prior-to-Capping.cfm.
3. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, THE USE OF SURFACE AND SUBSEA DISPERSANTS DURING THE BP DEEPWATER
HORIZON OIL SPILL, STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 4, 12 (2011), available at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/document/use-surface-and-subsea-dispersantsduring-bp-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill [hereinafter STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 4].
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particularly at such great depths or volumes.4 Lisa Jackson, EPA
administrator, called her decision to approve BP’s subsea dispersant use
the hardest decision she ever made.5
As days turned to weeks and the oil continued to spill, it became
obvious that both BP and the government were woefully unprepared to
respond to a spill of this magnitude.6 The horror and chaos of the oil
spill put the government in the awkward position of leading the efforts to
respond to the spill while relying on industry resources and expertise.7
This also resulted in a tug-of-war within the Obama Administration
between its enforcement and regulation roles and its need to cooperate
with BP in order to stop the flow of oil and recover from the spill.8 The
use of subsea dispersants most clearly exemplified this conflict as the
government’s lack of knowledge about the effects of dispersants made it
almost impossible for it to fulfill its legal duty to protect the nation’s
waters and wildlife from pollutants.
Two U.S. federal laws, the Clean Water Act (CWA)9 and the
Endangered Species Act (ESA),10 contain provisions that specifically
ensure that dispersant approval and use will not jeopardize imperiled
wildlife and the resources on which they depend. In light of the general
lack of knowledge regarding the effects of dispersants used in response
to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and the harm they may have caused,
it has become evident that these two environmental laws, their
implementation, or both, were inadequate to safeguard the environment
and wildlife from the disaster response.
This Article examines the use of dispersants in response to the BP oil
spill. The authors describe the ways in which the CWA and the ESA
4. Id. at 1-2, 4.
5. Jeff Goodell, The Poisoning, ROLLING STONE, July 21, 2010,
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-poisoning-20100721.
6. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE
DRILLING 182 (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT].
7. Id. at 134-35 (noting that while the Coast Guard has the option under 40 C.F.R. §
300.305(d) to “federalize” the spill—conducting and funding all aspects of the response
and later seeking reimbursement from the responsible party—the Coast Guard preferred
to view BP as a “co-combatant in the fight against the oil”).
8. Id. at 136 (“Though the Coast Guard and MMS believed they had to work closely
with BP, others in government did not share this view of the relationship with the
responsible party.”).
9. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1381 (2006).
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2007).
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authorize the EPA to regulate the use of dispersants and suggest how the
regulation of dispersants could be strengthened. Part II discusses the
development of contingency plans for oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico
and the pre-spill consultation process for dispersants’ effects on wildlife.
Part III describes BP’s dispersant use in response to the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill and recent scientific research identifying potential
effects on the ocean and marine wildlife. Part IV discusses lessons
learned from the oil spill and concludes that future preparedness will
require better agency implementation or even legislative action.
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING DISPERSANTS: THE
CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
A. The Clean Water Act
With respect to the use of dispersants, the CWA has seemingly
conflicting mandates. The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters,11 but also authorizes the President to allow the
application of dispersants to water in the event of an oil spill.12 The broad
authority that the CWA provides for the mitigation of oil spills is a
testament to the devastation the spills can cause. This authority, however,
is not completely unfettered; the CWA requires prior planning for
dispersant use. Response activities must be conducted pursuant to a
National Contingency Plan (NCP), and the EPA is charged with listing
dispersants on the NCP Product Schedule as part of its preparation of the
NCP.13 While the listing of a dispersant on the schedule does not
constitute EPA’s approval of the product for use on an oil spill,14 it is a
prerequisite that makes the product lawfully available for use in oil spill
response activities.15
B. Listing Dispersants on the Product Schedule
EPA regulations require that a dispersant product on the schedule be
at least 45 percent effective, and that the toxicity testing results factor

11. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (2006); see also 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (2010) (defining
harmful discharges under the Act).
12. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)-(d).
13. Id. § 1321(d); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.905(a) (regulations requiring NCP Product
Schedule).
14. 40 C.F.R. § 300.920(e).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(G).
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into the product’s effectiveness value.16 The toxicity testing is not
intended to estimate the dispersant’s ecosystem effects, but merely tests
for acute toxicity within forty-eight and ninety-six hours.17 The tests do
not consider environmental persistence, effectiveness with multiple
varieties of oil and at multiple temperatures, byproducts, or endocrine
effects.18 While the industry is responsible for toxicity testing, the EPA
retains the right to conduct its own testing to verify industry results and
to weigh EPA testing results in determining whether the product meets
listing criteria.19
The EPA currently lists fifteen dispersants on the NCP Product
Schedule, two of which belong to the Corexit brand and are the two
dispersants BP used most heavily in response to its oil spill.20 Corexit
9500 was listed on April 13, 1994, and was relisted on December 18,
1995, under the name Corexit 9500A.21 Corexit 9527 was listed on
March 10, 1978, and was relisted on December 18, 1995, and is now
listed under the name Corexit EC9527A.22 The EPA’s NCP Product
Schedule guide indicates that Corexit 9500A and 9527A are most
appropriate for surface application and have an average effectiveness rate
of around 50 percent.23 It also recommends the application volume for
Corexit 9500A and 9527A is two to ten gallons per acre.24
C. Contingency Plans for the Gulf of Mexico
The NCP also requires the development of Area Contingency Plans
(ACPs), prepared by a designated “Area Committee” comprised of
federal, local, and state officials and approved by the EPA and the Coast
Guard.25 In addition to ACPs, Regional Response Teams (RRTs) are
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

40 C.F.R. §§ 300.905(a), 300.915(a)(8), 300.920, 300.920(a).
40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. C, 3.1.
STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 4, supra note 3, at 6.
40 C.F.R. § 300.920(a).
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Contingency Plan Product Schedule, U.S.
ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY
(May
11,
2011),
http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/oil/ncp/schedule.pdf.
21. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, COREXIT® EC9500A, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/ncp/products/corex950.htm.
22. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, COREXIT® EC9527A, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/ncp/products/corex952.htm.
23. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDE TO USING THE NCP PRODUCT SCHEDULE
NOTEBOOK
10-12,
20-22
(2011),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/oil/ncp/notebook.pdf.
24. Id. at 12.
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(4).
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responsible for developing and maintaining Regional Contingency Plans
(RCPs).26 The RCPs “follow the format of the NCP” and coordinate
response between state emergency plans and area-specific contingency
plans.27 An RCP must be developed for each EPA region, in addition to a
separate RCP for Alaska.28 For example, the approved RCPs for EPA
Region 4 (Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida) and Region 6 (including
Louisiana and Texas) guided BP’s dispersant use in the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill.29
EPA and the Coast Guard, as co-chairs of the Region 4 RRT,
approved the Regional Response Team Oil Spill Dispersant Use Policy
(Region 4 Policy) in 1996.30 The Region 4 Policy “preauthorizes limited
use of dispersants by the pre-designated United States Coast Guard OnScene Coordinator (OSC) on oil discharges impacting Federal waters and
other specifically designated areas.”31 The Region 4 Policy specified that
further consultation would not be required for dispersant use within preauthorized areas so long as the appropriate RRT agencies are
immediately notified and applicable protocols followed.32 Dispersant use
is pre-authorized for “green zone” areas, which are defined as offshore
areas at least three miles from shore, outside state jurisdictions, where
the water is at least ten meters deep.33 In “yellow zones,” the Coast
Guard must request authorization from the RRT.34 Yellow zones are
waters under state or federal special management, such as wildlife
refuges, National Park Service areas, or proposed or designated critical
habitats; waters within three miles of shore or within state jurisdiction;
or, waters less than ten meters deep.35 Dispersant use is prohibited in “red
zones” unless necessary to prevent or mitigate risk to human health or
safety.36 No red zones have been designated.37

26. 40 C.F.R. § 300.210(b).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 4, supra note 3, at 6.
30. REGION IV REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM, USE OF DISPERSANTS IN REGION IV (1996).
31. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. & Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Biological Assessment
of Effects on Listed Species of Region IV Regional Response Team Oil Spill Dispersant
Use Policy, in USE OF DISPERSANTS IN REGION IV, 32, 33, 72 (1996).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 33-34.
34. Id. at 34.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 34-35.
37. Id.
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Region 6 re-approved its Dispersant Pre-Approval Guidelines and
Checklist (Region 6 Guidelines) on January 24, 2001.38 The Region 6
Guidelines provide pre-approval authority to the Federal On Scene
Coordinator (FOSC) for dispersant use in the U.S. Exclusive Economic
Zone off the Texas and Louisiana coasts. Under the Guidelines, “[t]he
only requirement for dispersant product selection is that the dispersant
must be included on the NCP Product Schedule and considered
appropriate by the FOSC for existing environmental and physical
conditions.”39 The guidelines contemplate surface application of
dispersants, setting forth pre-approval criteria for aerial spraying and
surface boat spray systems.40 While “alternative platforms” may be
considered, none are specified or discussed.41
D. The Endangered Species Act
Congress intended that the ESA protect and conserve species from
extinction. Accordingly, section 7 of the ESA requires federal agencies
to engage in consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (collectively, the Services) to
ensure that “any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency
. . . is not likely to jeopardize” any listed species or adversely modify
critical habitat.42 In order for an agency’s action to trigger the
consultation requirements of section 7(a)(2), the action must be both an
affirmative action and discretionary.43 Section 7(a)(2) typically applies

38. FEDERAL REGION VI REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM, FOSC DISPERSANT PREAPPROVAL GUIDELINES AND CHECKLIST 1 (2001) [hereinafter REGION VI GUIDELINES].
39. Id. at 1.
40. Id. at 2-3, 14.
41. This led to confusion during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, because the EPA
believed that the RRT did not preauthorize the subsea application of dispersants and
wanted the ultimate approval to come from a higher level within the EPA; meanwhile the
responders were left without clear communication or immediate direction from the EPA.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 145.
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
43. “In order for section 7(a)(2) to apply, there must be discretionary federal agency
action. Federal agency ‘action’ is defined by regulation and broadly construed by the
courts to include any action in which there is some federal discretionary involvement or
control. . . . [A]n agency’s action must be ‘affirmative’; an agency that is merely
providing advice or declining to act in a certain way is generally not engaging in agency
action subject to section 7.” Patrick W. Ryan and Erika E. Malmen, Interagency
Consultation Under Section 7, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY AND
PERSPECTIVES 105-106 (Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert Irvin, eds., 2d ed. 2010); see also
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 649 (2007).
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to ongoing agency action as well as programmatic agency action that
guides or constrains subsequent activities, so long as the challenged
federal agency retains discretionary control to make decisions that could
inure to the benefit of ESA-listed species and critical habitat.44
To fulfill this mandate, the acting agency first prepares a biological
assessment to determine whether the action “may affect” a listed species,
and if so, the agency must initiate consultation with either FWS or
NMFS, depending on the species involved.45 At the completion of
consultation, FWS or NMFS will issue either a written statement
concurring that the action is not likely to adversely affect a species, or a
biological opinion that determines if the agency action is likely to
jeopardize the species.46 If jeopardy is found, the opinion must specify
reasonable and prudent alternatives that will avoid jeopardy and allow
the agency to proceed with the action.47
In 2001, the EPA and the Coast Guard entered into an Interagency
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) outlining ESA consultation
procedures for preparing oil spill Contingency Plans.48 Pursuant to the
MOA, the EPA and the Coast Guard must initiate informal consultation
with the Services when drafting an ACP if any endangered and
threatened animal may be affected by the plan.49 During consultation,
the EPA, the Coast Guard, and the Services must identify sensitive areas
and methods to avoid adverse impacts on listed wildlife.50 If “potential
adverse effects are identified and removed,” the Services will provide a
concurrence letter, but if not, formal ESA consultation must be
undertaken.51
The Region 4 RRT, including the EPA and the Coast Guard,
conducted biological assessments (Region 4 BA) of the effects of the
Region 4 policy on species under the jurisdiction of the Services.52

44. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14.
47. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3).
48. See Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Serv., Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Nat’l Ocean Serv., and Dep’t of the Interior
Regarding Oil Spill Planning and Response Activities Under the Fed. Water Pollution
Control Act’s Nat’l Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan and the
Endangered Species Act (2001) [hereinafter MOA].
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 6.
52. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENTS AND SECTION 7 CONSULTATION FOR THREATENED AND ENDANGERED

382

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:2

Notably, the assumptions made in the Region 4 BA regarding the
amounts of dispersants that would be applied, the depth at which they
would be applied, and the duration of wildlife and ecosystem exposure
did not hold true for the Deepwater Horizon response. The Region 4 BA
assumed that dispersants would largely be applied at the surface of the
water in moderate amounts early in the spill response effort. For
example, the Region 4 BA assumed that food chain effects from prey
contamination were unlikely due to “low concentrations and short
duration of exposure to dispersed oil.”53 The Region 4 BA also
concluded that dispersants would not likely cause significant additional
harm to birds or fur-bearing mammals, despite destroying their ability to
insulate themselves or repel water, because “[w]ithin the normal range of
operating dosages, biological effects are due to the dispersed oil, not the
dispersant.”54 The Region 4 BA acknowledged that sea turtles could
experience higher exposure to oil and dispersants in the water column
after dispersant application, but simply assumed that “exposure will be
short-term and concentrations low” due to rapid dilution.55
Based on these assumptions—and scant information regarding
dispersant effects in general—the Region 4 BA concluded that dispersant
use “under appropriate conditions” was “not likely to adversely affect
listed species beyond the potential effects of the spilled oil or add to the
cumulative environmental stresses currently acting on the species.”56
The document also specified that consultation “will be re-initiated if
additional information not previously considered becomes available
indicating adverse effects to listed species or critical habitat from the
identified action.”57
Similarly, the “Bioassessment of the Potential Impacts Resulting
from Dispersant Use in Offshore Waters in the Gulf of Mexico” (Region
6 BA) findings are based on the assumption that dispersants would be
applied to the surface of the ocean and at “recommended” application
rates.58 The Region 6 BA bases its evaluation of species’ risk from
SPECIES, in OCEAN AND COASTAL WATERS DISPERSANT USE, REGION IV REGIONAL
RESPONSE TEAM 35.
53. Id. at 40; see also id. at 84.
54. Id. at 39.
55. Id. at 83.
56. Id. at 85-86.
57. Id. at 86.
58. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOASSESSMENT
OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS RESULTING FROM DISPERSANT USE IN OFFSHORE WATERS IN
THE GULF OF MEXICO, in RRT-6 FOSC DISPERSANT USE PRE-APPROVAL GUIDELINES AND
CHECKLIST, REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM VI, app. 5-9.
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dispersant effects largely on whether the species lives at the surface or in
offshore waters. For example, it assumes that sea turtles, sperm whales,
and red snapper are only at “medium” risk of being directly affected by
dispersant use because sea turtles were thought to have low numbers
habitating offshore, and sperm whales and red snapper were thought to
prefer deep water habitat.59 The Region 6 BA found that important prey
species, such as Gulf menhaden and blue crabs, had a high risk of
negative impacts from dispersant use, because these organisms are found
in the water column in offshore waters.60 The Region 6 BA did not
discuss particular impacts to sea turtles or marine mammals, relying
instead on a 1994 statement by NMFS, made in response to a request for
ESA consultation, that “the species under our purview are not likely to
be adversely affected by the use of chemical countermeasures in
response to an oil spill.”61 The Region 6 BA also discounted the
likelihood that dispersants could adversely affect birds.62
The MOA authorizes emergency ESA consultations, pursuant to 50
C.F.R. § 402.05, for oil spill response activities.63 When listed species or
critical habitat are, or could be, present in the area affected by the spill,
the FOSC designated under the NCP must initiate emergency ESA
consultation by contacting the Services.64 The NOAA regional response
coordinator and scientific support coordinator are tasked with
coordinating species expertise, which may involve participation by
Services staff from local field offices as well as Services participation in
the FOSC Incident Command System.65
PART III: THE IMPACTS OF DISPERSANTS ON WILDLIFE
A. The Use of Dispersants in Response to the BP Oil Spill
Dispersants are one of several tools authorized for use in response to
oil spills. However, the use of dispersants in response to the BP oil spill
was in sharp contrast in methodology, scale, and scope to anything the
EPA or Coast Guard had envisioned or considered in the past. In the
first few weeks of the oil spill, the federal government simply deferred to
BP’s choice of dispersants and their use. Indeed, on May 10, the EPA
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at app. 7.
Id. at app. 8.
Id. at app. 13.
Id. at app. 13-14.
MOA, supra note 48, at 7; see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.05.
MOA, supra note 48, at 7.
Id.
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issued BP a directive essentially authorizing what amounted to a largescale scientific experiment in the Gulf of Mexico, under which BP was
required to determine that subsurface dispersant application was
chemically breaking up the oil and then to sample and delineate the
dispersed plume.66 The directive also called for BP to consult the RRT if
dissolved oxygen near the plume fell below 2 mg/L or if toxicity tests
revealed “excessive exertion of a toxic response.”67 David Valentine, a
geomicrobiologist at the University of California, Santa Barbara,
described BP’s use of dispersants as “an experiment that’s never been
performed before—to dump that much of an industrial chemical into the
ocean.”68
BP’s early reports failed to satisfy the EPA’s requirements, and
toxicity tests soon revealed that the Corexit dispersants had potential to
kill up to 25 percent of organisms living five hundred feet below the
surface in areas where the dispersants were used.69 The EPA Product
Schedule ranked Corexit 9500A and 9527A as more toxic and less
effective than other EPA-approved dispersants for use on Louisiana
Sweet Crude (LSC), the type of oil that spewed from BP’s broken well.70
These dispersants are known toxins to wildlife. Corexit 9527A contains
2-butoxyethanol, which ruptures red blood cells, and in high, yet realistic
concentrations, can be more toxic than crude oil alone.71 Notably, BP
66. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DISPERSANT MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT
DIRECTIVE FOR SUBSURFACE DISPERSANT APPLICATION 1 (May 10, 2010).
67. Id. at 3.
68. Amanda Mascarelli, Debate Grows Over Impact of Dispersed Oil, NATURE, July
10, 2010, http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100710/full/news.2010.347.html.
69. Matt Gutman, Lee Farren & Bradley Blackburn, EPA May Not Force BP to
Change Dispersants, ABC NEWS, May 21, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/epz-bpdispersants/story?id=10711367; BP SAMPLING RESULTS (IN VARIOUS FORMATS) FROM MAY
15 TO AUGUST 31, BP’S ANALYSIS OF SUBSURFACE DISPERSANT USE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants-bp.html (last updated Jan.
10, 2011) (showing 75 percent rotifer survival at 500 feet on May 15, 2010).
70. National Contingency Plan Product Schedule Toxicity and Effectiveness
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
Summaries,
U.S.
ENVTL.
http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/ncp/tox_tables.htm (last updated Mar. 30,
2011).
71. See, e.g., Peter H. Albers, Effects of Corexit 9527 on the Hatchability of Mallard
Eggs, 23 BULLETIN OF ENVTL. CONTAMINATION AND TOXICOLOGY 661 (1979); S.
Bhattacharya et al., Toxicity to Freshwater Organisms from Oils and Oil Spills Chemical
Treatments in Laboratory Microcosms, 122 ENVTL. POLLUTION 122, 205 (2003); Mace G.
Barron et al., 2003, Photoenhanced Toxicity of Aqueous Phase and Chemically Dispersed
Weathered Alaska North Slope Crude Oil to Pacific Herring Eggs and Larvae, 22 ENVTL.
TOXICOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY, 650 (2003); Ruth I. Ibemesim & Joseph F. Bamidele,
Comparative Toxicity of Two Oil Types and Two Dispersants on the Growth of a
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stopped using Corexit 9527A early in the response because of alleged
health effects on workers in the Exxon-Valdez response.72 Multiple
studies on the effects of Corexit 9500A have concluded that its use
increased the exposure of fish to the polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
(PAHs) found in crude oil.73
One of the many complaints about Corexit was that “[w]e already
know that dispersants are less toxic than oil if you compare the two. . . .
[b]ut because Corexit contains a petroleum solvent, we’re actually
putting petroleum solvent on top of a petroleum spill. So it’s increasing
the hydrocarbons in the water column.”74 Dispersants can release toxic
break-down products, such as PAHs from oil, which can make dispersed
oil even more harmful than oil left untreated.75 Furthermore, these
dispersants can actually facilitate the entry of oil into the body of

Seashore Grass, Paspalum vaginatum, 2008 INT’L OIL SPILL CONFERENCE 875 (2008);
R.A. Khan & J.F. Payne, Influence of a Crude Oil Dispersant, Corexit 9527, and
Dispersed Oil on Capelin (Mallotus villosus), Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua), Longhorn
sculpin (Myoxocephalus octodecemspinosus), and cunner (Tautogolabrus adspersus), 75
BULLETIN OF ENVTL.. CONTAMINATION AND TOXICOLOGY 50 (2005); Ismail Gulec &
Douglas A. Holdway, Toxicity of Dispersant, Oil and Dispersed Oil to Two Marine
Organisms, 1997 INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL CONFERENCE 1010 (1997); Alexander A.
Venn et al., P-glycoprotein (Multi-xenobiotic Resistance) and Heat Shock Protein Gene
Expression in the Reef Coral Montastraea franksi in Response to Environmental
Toxicants, 93 AQUATIC TOXICOLOGY 188 (2009).
72. STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 4, supra note 3, at 8.
73. See generally Shahunthala D. Ramachandran et al., Oil Dispersant Increases PAH
Uptake by Fish Exposed to Crude Oil, 59 ECOTOXICOLOGY AND ENVTL. SAFETY 300
(2004); Brian S. Anderson et al., Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Dispersed
Prudhoe Bay Crude Oil on Developing Topsmelt Embryos, Atherinops affinis, 157
ENVTL. POLLUTION 1058 (2009); Stephen McIntosh et al.,, Toxicity of Dispersed
Weathered Crude Oil to Early Life Stages of Atlantic Herring (Clupea harengus), 29
ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY 1160 (2010).
74. SUSAN D. SHAW, CONSENSUS STATEMENT: SCIENTISTS OPPOSE THE USE OF
DISPERSANT CHEMICALS IN THE GULF OF MEXICO 4, MARINE ENVTL. RESEARCH INST.
(2010), available at http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100710/full/news.2010.347.html.
75. See generally Catherine M. Couillard et al., Effect of Dispersant on the
Composition of the Water-Accommodated Fraction of Crude Oil and its Toxicity to
Larval Marine Fish, 24 ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY 1496 (2005); Mihoko
Yamada et al., Study on the Fate of Petroleum-derived Polycyclic Aromatic
Hydrocarbons (PAHs) and the Effect of Chemical Dispersant Using an Enclosed
Ecosystem, Mesocosm, 47 MARINE POLLUTION BULLETIN 105 (2003); A.A. Otitoloju,
Evaluation of Crude Oil Degradation Under a no-control and Dispersant-Control
Settings, Based on Biological and Physical Techniques, 4 INT’L J. OF ENVTL. RESEARCH
353 (2010).

386

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:2

animals.76 In addition, the ingredients in the Corexit dispersants were not
initially disclosed; instead, ingredients were listed in a group rather than
as a single chemical.77 Scientists were concerned that without knowing
the actual ingredients, it would not be possible to truly asses the human
health or environmental effects.78 Eventually Nalco, the company that
manufactures Corexit, caved to public pressure and disclosed Corexit’s
ingredients.79
Despite these concerns, on May 15, 2010, the EPA authorized BP to
use dispersants sub-surface at the wellhead under the premise that by
injecting dispersants at the source of the oil, less dispersants would be
needed.80 Five days later, under pressure from an outraged public and
concerned scientific experts, the EPA issued an addendum to its directive
giving BP twenty hours to identify more effective and less toxic
dispersants on the Product Schedule.81 Just one day earlier, BP had
applied 70,000 gallons of dispersants in a single day.82 However, BP
refused to use other dispersants claiming that they were either more
environmentally damaging or not available in sufficient quantity.83
One week later, the EPA directed BP to reduce dispersant use by 75
percent from daily peak use by eliminating surface application and
limiting subsurface application to 15,000 gallons per day.84 The EPA
reports that over the next month, BP reduced its dispersant use 68
76. KATHLEEN BURNS & MICHAEL R. HARBUT, SCIENCECORPS, GULF OIL SPILL
HAZARDS
14
(2010),
available
at
http://www.sciencecorps.org/Gulf_Spill_Chemical_Hazards_Report.pdf.
77. SHAW, supra note 74, at 3.
78. Id.
79. See Nalco, Corexit Ingredients, NALCO NORTH AMERICA, http://www.nalco.com/
news-and-events/4297.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2011).
80. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Coast Guard and EPA Approve Use of Dispersant
Subsea in Further Effort to Prevent Oil from Reaching U.S. Shoreline / Agencies Reserve
Authority to Stop the Use of the Dispersant At Any Time, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (May 15, 2010), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac
8525735900400c27/f29adfca80ccd1a685257726004f0617!OpenDocument.
81. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DISPERSANT MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT
DIRECTIVE – ADDENDUM 2 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/
directive-addendum2.pdf.
82. Goodell, supra note 5.
83. Letter from Doug Suttles, BP Chief Operating Officer, to Mary Landry, Fed. OnSite Coordinator, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard and Samuel Coleman, P.E., Dir.,
Superfund Div., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (May 20, 2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/5-21bp-response.pdf.
84. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DISPERSANT MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT
DIRECTIVE – ADDENDUM 3 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/
directive-addendum3.pdf.
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percent.85 The reason for the discrepancy was BP’s frequent request for,
and approval of, exemptions from the Coast Guard and EPA, which had
the final approval authority.86 Congressman Edward J. Markey chastised
Admiral Thad Allen, National Incident Commander, for allowing surface
application “virtually every day since the Directive was issued on May
26, 2010,” until the flow of oil from the well was stopped.87
Congressman Markey noted that in forty-eight days, BP, the Houma
Unified Command, or both, made seventy-four requests for exemptions,
and that in all but ten cases the Coast Guard approved the exemption
without modifying the requested daily maximum quantities of
dispersants. Additionally, in one of those ten cases, the Coast Guard
increased the maximum dispersant use requested from 30,600 gallons to
43,000 gallons.88
While Congressman Markey was clearly challenging the Coast
Guard’s apparent rubberstamping of the exemptions, the Coast Guard
was complaining that the approval process was not fast enough. On June
22, 2010, citing hardship and delay in the exemption approval process,
Rear Admiral James Watson, the FOSC, asked the Region 6 RRT to draft
a new addendum to “empower incident commanders to make real-time
decisions to use appropriate amounts of dispersants” and “allow the use
of dispersants to appropriately control volatile organic compounds.”89
Despite Watson’s request for more flexibility regarding quantities of
dispersants, on June 23, 2010, the government issued “Guidance on
Subsea Dispersant Application” which maintained the 15,000 gallon per
day subsea dispersant limit but allowed increases in the application rate
where winds were less than ten knots or where volatile organic
compound (VOC) readings indicated potential health concerns.90 In

85. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA’s Toxicity Testing of Dispersants, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants-testing.html (last visited
Jan. 10, 2011).
86. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 160.
87. Letter from Edward J. Markey, Congressman, to Thad Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast
Guard (July 30, 2010), available at http://markey.house.gov/docs/07-3010ejmtocgdispersants.pdf.
88. Id.
89. Letter from James A. Watson, Fed. On-Scene Coordinator, Rear Admiral, U.S.
Coast Guard, to Reg’l Response Team, Fed. Region VI (June 22, 2010), available at
http://markey.house.gov/images/DISPERSANTDOCUMENTSJUNE22-24.pdf.
90. Letter from Douglas J. Suttles, BP Chief Operating Officer, to James A. Watson,
Fed. On-Scene Coordinator, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard (June 23, 2010), available
at http://markey.house.gov/images/DISPERSANTDOCUMENTSJUNE22-24.pdf; see 40
C.F.R. § 300.910(d) (allowing the on-scene coordinator to authorize dispersant use
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reply to Congressman Markey’s concerns, Admiral Allen noted that a
FOSC must strike a balance between limiting the use of dispersants and
protecting human health and safety at risk from sending responders
closer to a hazardous environment.91
On July 6, 2010, BP responded to EPA’s request for BP to provide a
“high-level description of its plans going forward with regard to the use
of dispersants.”92 BP assured the government that under all conditions,
the use of subsea dispersants would be held under the 15,000 gallon limit
but that, “it is critical that we maintain the capabilities to apply subsea
dispersant to meet unforeseen contingencies such as weather disruptions
or equipment failures.”93 Essentially, BP agreed to reduce dispersant use
only if it successfully reduced the oil release and to stay within the
15,000 gallon limit only if circumstances allowed it.
The conflict over dispersant use continued throughout the oil spill
response.94 The final exchanges over dispersants included the
government’s denial of a BP request to apply 10,000 gallons of
dispersants to oil slicks.95 This generated a reply from the FOSC,
protesting over the removal of dispersants from the response tool kit.96
Ultimately the government prohibited BP from using any dispersants the
day before BP capped the well.97
B. Dispersant Impacts to Species and Humans
In the hours following an oil spill, some of the oil disperses naturally
due to wave action and ocean turbulence. Chemical dispersants are
typically applied to the surface of the water to enhance the natural
dispersion process by breaking down the oil into more fine droplets.
Dispersed oil is less likely to reach nearshore and shoreline areas and is
thought to minimize the direct contact wildlife have with the spilled oil.
without obtaining concurrence of the EPA and state RRT representatives where use of a
product is necessary “to prevent or substantially reduce a hazard to human life”).
91. Letter from Thad Allen, Nat’l Incident Commander, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard,
to
Edward
Markey,
Congressman
(Oct.
1,
2010),
available
at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/Allen%20Dispersants%20Letter%2010.1.10.pdf.
92. Letter from Doug Suttles, BP Chief Operating Officer, to James Watson, Fed. OnSite Coordinator, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard (July 6, 2010), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/34931289/2010-07-06-Suttles-Watson.
93. Id.
94. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 160-61.
95. Id. at 161.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Oil is highly toxic to most life forms. Specifically, the chemicals in
crude oil, namely PAHs and VOCs, can damage major life systems and
even prove fatal.98 For example, during and after the BP oil spill, there
were reports of high amounts of benzene, a carcinogen found in crude
oil, and reports of people having difficulty breathing, headaches, internal
bleeding, nausea, and other extreme symptoms.99 The chemical
compounds found in petroleum can affect the nervous system,
reproductive system, circulatory system, endocrine system,
gastrointestinal system, musculoskeletal system, and hematopoietic
system.100 This damage can be acute or chronic, and can manifest within
moments or years.101 Moreover, the effects of oil can occur through
physical contact or contact via the food web.102
Dispersants themselves are also toxic, and can increase the toxicity
of oil. Some dispersants contain nonylphenol ethoxylates which degrade
into estrogenic compounds or endocrine disruptors.103 Furthermore,
dispersants can make it easier for oil to move through the skin of living
organisms.104 Currently, the precise effect of the use of dispersants,
especially at the extreme volumes and depths BP applied them, are
unknown.105 Even EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson admitted “[w]e are
still deeply concerned about these things we don’t know. The long-term
effect on aquatic life are still unknown, and we must make sure that the
dispersants that are used are as non-toxic as possible.”106
Dispersants may have increased the volume of oil in deepwater
plumes—highly dispersed oil droplets and dissolved gases between
thirty-two hundred and forty-two hundred feet deep and extending for
many miles—with unknown effects on the deepwater environment.107
The plumes of oil droplets and dispersants can engulf small plankton,
98. BURNS & HARBUT, supra note 76, at 3.
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 9-10.
102. Id. at 4.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id. at 14.
105. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 182.
106. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Statement by EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson From
Press Conference on Dispersant Use in the Gulf of Mexico with U.S. Coast Guard Rear
Admiral Landry, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (May 24, 2010, 3:30 PM),
http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/transcript-may24.pdf.
107. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 182; see also Juliet Eilperin et al., Oil Spreading
Much Farther Than Thought; Obama Returns to Gulf Coast, WASH. POST May 29, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/28/AR2010052801495.html?nav=emailpage.
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fish eggs, and larvae. Loss of these food sources can cause a chain
reaction affecting organisms throughout the food web.108
Also unknown is the biodegradation rate of dispersants
themselves.109 While LSC is reported to degrade in twelve to seventy
days in seawater, and chemical dispersants can speed its degradation,110
prior to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, no deepwater applications of
dispersant had been conducted, and thus no data existed on the
environmental impacts of dispersants in deepwater.111 Since the oil spill,
scientists have discovered that a chemical component of the dispersants,
the surfactant dioctyl sodium sulfosuccinate (DOSS) remained in the
water sixty-four days after BP ceased applying dispersants.112 Scientists
found DOSS up to 300 kilometers from the well where it was applied,
and concluded that rates of biodegradation have been negligible or slow.
An August 4, 2010, interagency report claimed that approximately
74 percent of the spilled oil was gone.113 Internal emails regarding the
report showed that NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco objected to
this portrayal, saying that “[f]ifty percent of it is gone—either evaporated
or burned, skimmed or recovered from the wellhead. 24 percent has been
dispersed, and although much of this is in the process of being degraded,
it is not ‘gone’ yet.”114 This disagreement illustrates one controversy
regarding the use of dispersants: dispersed oil may be less visible, but
that decreased visibility does not necessarily mean that the oil is gone
altogether.

108. See generally Charles H. Peterson et al., Long-Term Ecosystem Response to the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 302 SCI. 2082 (2003).
109. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Questions and Answers on Dispersants, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants-qanda.html#general (last visited
Jan. 10, 2010).
110. Albert D. Venosa & E.L. Holder, Biodegradability of Dispersed Crude Oil at Two
Different Temperatures, 54 MARINE POLLUTION BULLETIN 545, 547 (2007).
111. Elizabeth B. Kujawinski et al., Fate of Dispersants Associated with the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill, 45 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1298, 1298 (2011).
112. Id.
113. JANE LUBCHENCO ET AL., DEEPWATER HORIZON/BP OIL BUDGET: WHAT HAPPENED
TO THE OIL? (Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/
stories2010/20100804_oil.html.
114. Katie Howell, Gulf Spill: E-mails show friction between White House, federal
scientists over oil report, E&ENEWSPM (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/
eenewspm/2011/01/25/archive/1?terms=oil+spill+budget.
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PART IV: LESSONS LEARNED
It is evident that BP and the government were unprepared for the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The complicated and critical question now
is how can industry, government, and the public better prepare for the
next oil spill.
A. Litigation Regarding Dispersants
Several ongoing lawsuits could force more rigorous agency
compliance with the ESA and the CWA. For example, on June 2, 2010,
the Center for Biological Diversity (the Center) notified the EPA and the
Coast Guard of its intent to sue for ESA violations related to the approval
and use of chemical dispersants in the Gulf of Mexico.115 The Center
alleged that dispersants may adversely affect multiple threatened and
endangered species, including sea turtles, sperm whales, and Gulf
sturgeon.116 The Center is currently in negotiations with the EPA and
Coast Guard to compel their compliance with section 7 of the ESA by
consulting with the Services in order to ensure that listing Corexit
9500A, 9527A, and other dispersants in the NCP Product Schedule for
use in oil spill response activities does not result in jeopardy to
endangered species, or destruction or adverse modification of critical
habitat.
In separate litigation, on July 14, 2010, the Florida Wildlife
Federation and the Gulf Restoration Network sued the EPA over its
failure to disclose information about chemical dispersants.117 The
complaint alleged that, in response to a Freedom of Information Act
request, the EPA had disclosed the ingredients of chemical dispersants
but refused to release requested health and safety information.118
Resolution of this lawsuit could lead to more transparency in the
approval process and use of dispersants.
115. Letter from Andrea Treece, Senior Attorney, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, to Lisa
Jackson, Adm’r, EPA & Robert J. Papp, Commandant, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard (June
2,
2010),
available
at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/
public_lands/energy/dirty_energy_development/oil_and_gas/gulf_oil_spill/pdfs/Gulf_dis
persant_ESA_reconsultation_NOI_6-2-10.pdf.
116. Id.
117. See Press Release, Earthjustice, Conservation Groups Act to Uncover What’s in
Gulf Oil Dispersants (July 14, 2010), available at http://earthjustice.org/news/
press/2010/conservation-groups-act-to-uncover-what-s-in-gulf-oil-dispersants.
118. Complaint at 8-9, Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, (N.D. Fla.
2010) (Civ. 10-293).
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Additionally, on October 13, 2010, a diverse group of organizations
sent the EPA a petition to establish toxicity criteria and require toxicity
testing and public disclosure of ingredients.119 On the same day, the
same groups sent the EPA a notice of their intent to sue the EPA over its
failure to perform nondiscretionary duties under the CWA.120 The
groups specifically alleged that the EPA failed to publish a schedule
identifying the waters in which dispersants, other chemicals, and other
spill-mitigating devices and substances may be used and the quantities in
which such substances can be used safely.121 The petition and any
resulting litigation could lead to the EPA adopting better testing
disclosure procedures with respect to the use of dispersants.
B. Dispersants Reform
The government has begun the process of reviewing its regulations
and existing ACPs and RCPs to reflect lessons learned during the
Deepwater Horizon response.122 The EPA is currently working on
revising the regulations regarding the use of dispersants and other
chemicals and the NCP Product Schedule.123 On November 2, 2010, the
EPA issued a memorandum announcing it was using information
gathered as a result of the oil spill to engage federal partners via the NRT
to reassess dispersant use guidelines under the NCP and to initiate review
of the criteria and testing requirements for listing and delisting
dispersants.124 The EPA requested that the regional administrators ensure
RRT representatives work with RRT partners to: implement changes to
ACPs and RCPs; develop a hierarchy of preferred oil spill response
measures; provide site-specific and oil-specific rationale for conditions
119. See Press Release, Earthjustice, How Toxic are Oil Dispersants? Groups Press
EPA to Find Out Before Next Spill (Oct. 13, 2010), available at
http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2010/how-toxic-are-oil-dispersants-groups-press-epato-find-out-before-next-spill.
120. See id.
121. Letter from Marianne Engelman Lado & Hannah Change, Counsel to Earthjustice,
to Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Providing Sixty-day Notice of Intent to
Sue
1
(Oct.
13,
2010),
available
at
http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/dispersant_notice_0.pdf.
122. Memorandum from Mathy Stanislaus, Assistant Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
to Regional Adm’rs, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, on the Revision of Area Contingency
Plans/Regional Contingency Plans Regarding Use of Dispersants on Oil Spills – Interim
Action
(Nov.
2,
2010),
available
at
http://www.rrt9.org/external/
content/document/2763/948163/1/EPA to review ACPs memo.pdf.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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or limitations for use of dispersants; create a process for evaluating use
of dispersants; take steps to ensure data and decisions are transparent;
and, as appropriate, reinitiate consultation on ACP/RCPs.125 These steps,
if implemented, could lead to better management of the use of
dispersants and a more protective regime for the environment and
wildlife.
While these efforts and ongoing litigation may lead to more
protective measures, the EPA should reconsider whether dispersants are
useful in light of the BP oil spill response efforts. The response activities
raised many issues. For example, a pre-approval plan limit on the
quantity of dispersants to be used appears to have been disregarded
during the frantic response efforts. Perhaps a more effective scheme
would result from tying the amount of dispersant use permitted to the
amount of oil spilled or how close the spilled oil is to the shore.
The Deepwater Horizon response also raised questions over the
toxicity of oil dispersants and their placement on the EPA’s Product
Schedule. Since the oil spill, the EPA has performed multi-phase toxicity
testing for eight dispersants listed on the NCP Product Schedule.126 The
testing found that the dispersants are of similar toxicity and that Corexit
9500A is “generally no more or less toxic” than other available
alternatives.127 In addition, no dispersant displayed biologically
significant endocrine-disrupting activity, a concern raised by BP in its
response to EPA’s May 20th directive to identify available dispersants
below a specified toxicity level.128 These results stand in contrast to the
data in the NCP Product Schedule, which indicated that some preapproved dispersants were both less toxic and more effective on LSC oil
than Corexit 9500.129
The fact that the EPA felt compelled to perform additional toxicity
testing of dispersants on the Product Schedule in the midst of the oil spill
and the fact that the results of that testing differed from the
manufacturer-supplied data undermines the entire Product Schedule
125. See id.
126. See EPA Releases Second Phase of Toxicity Testing Data for Eight Oil
(Aug.
2,
2010,
11:39
AM),
Dispersants,
RESTORETHEGULF.GOV
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/08/02/epa-releases-second-phase-toxicitytesting-data-eight-oil-dispersants.
127. Id.
128. Id; see also Letter from Douglas J. Suttles, BP Chief Operating Officer, to Mary
Landry, Fed. On-Site Coordinator, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, & Samuel Coleman,
Dir.,
Superfund
Div.
(May
20,
2010),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/ 5-21bp-response.pdf.
129. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 81.
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testing and approval process. If the EPA continues to approve dispersants
for use, it should strengthen the Product Schedule by independently
testing dispersant toxicity and the potential for endocrine-disrupting
activity before listing a dispersant. Toxicity testing should include testing
on the long-term and sub-lethal effects of dispersant use, the
environmental effects of dispersant-oil mixtures, and the effects of
dispersants on a broader variety of species. A meaningful review of
dispersants should also include consultation with the Services on the
effects dispersants have on threatened and endangered wildlife before
publication on the Product Schedule.
If these efforts reveal greater impacts to wildlife and the environment
than oil alone, the EPA should not permit dispersant use as an oil spill
response measure. At the very least, the EPA should reconcile the fact
that regulations prohibit the use of “sinking agents” as a response
measure.130 These are prohibited because their impacts on productive
benthic aquatic ecosystems would be greater than leaving the oil on the
surface and because biodegradation at depth is slower due to reduced
oxygen in bottom sediments.131 EPA should ask whether applying the
dispersants subsea may have had the same impact as a sinking agent.
PART V: CONCLUSION
BP’s use of dispersants, like the oil spill itself, was extraordinary.
While the CWA and the ESA authorize the EPA to regulate the use of
dispersants, it is evident that the development of contingency plans for
oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico and the pre-spill consultation process for
dispersants failed to protect the environment. Scientific research
indicates that dispersants have a previously unknown impact on deep
water ecosystems and may compromise marine wildlife. Future
preparedness for major oil spills requires, at a minimum, better agency
implementation of the existing laws and regulations. In the meantime,
EPA should continue to investigate to what extent the use of dispersants
is a viable oil spill response measure.

130. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.310(b), 300.910(e).
131. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, USE OF
CHEMICAL DISPERSANTS FOR MARINE OIL SPILLS 6 (1993), available at
http://www.epa.gov/nscep/.

